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On appeal, Sweeney raises the following arguments: (1) the district court erred in admitting evidence that was collected based on an overly broad and stale search warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights (2) the district court erred in failing to suppress statements made in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights (3) the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 414 (4) the district court erred in giving an aiding and abetting jury instruction and (5) the sentence Constitution.
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Defendant Neil Sweeney ("Sweeney") was convicted of distribution and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Weinreb, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. Jo-Ann Karshon, Office of the Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice, with whom William D. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Before Lynch, Stahl, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges. 17-1325 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 414(a) (4) the district court’s decision to give an aiding and abetting instruction was not in error and (5) Defendant’s sentence was constitutional. The Court held (1) Defendant waived his argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of a search warrant (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress (i) statements he made to the police during his arrest because his statements were not the product of an interrogation, (ii) statements he made during a police interview at the station house because Defendant’s Miranda waiver and consent were knowing and intelligent and made voluntarily, and (iii) statements he made during an interview because Defendant did not unambiguously request counsel (3) the district court did not err in admitting certain evidence under Fed. The First Circuit affirmed in all respects Defendant’s conviction of distribution and possession of child pornography and his sentence of seventeen years of imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release.